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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 920309-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee
vs.
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL,

Priority Classification 16

Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Section 78-2a-3(2) (f), Utah Code Annotated, as amended confers
jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to decide the appeal in
this case as this appeal is from a court of record, Davis County
District Court, involving a criminal case, a third degree felony.

-1-

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is a criminal

case

appealing

a

final

Judgment of

conviction and sentence of a third degree felony, Possession of a
Controlled Substance, to wit: cocaine, from the District Court of
Davis County, Utah,

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether or not the evidence seized from the warrantless

search of the defendant is admissible?
2.

Whether

or

not

Trooper

Maycock's

detention

of

the

defendant exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop and was
not justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?
3.

Whether or not seizure of cocaine from defendant and his

motor vehicle was obtained by wrongful exploitcition and therefore
not admissible?
4.

Whether or not Trooper Maycock had probable cause to

search defendant's motor vehicle?

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The standard of review is the same for all issues presented by
this appeal.

In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or

deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not be disturbed
-2-

unless they

ire clearly errone*

State v. Steward, 806 P

2d

i n revi ewi ng the trial
coui r -5 corn., ..asion.-

-

.

correction or error standard.

.appellate

-VJLZJL.

cour t

appl i es

a

BOS P. 2d at 23 5.

PETERMINATIVE CONGTTTUT' 101IA1 • IROVTSiOHT ,
STATTTTES | ORD1 NAN^ER , AMn Hr.JIjKf.5
1.

r\rtic:|p | ( section II nil I Inn M a t e nl lit.ill i..:onsl. l l.ut i on
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

o.

Section 4 1 -r 14.20(2) Utah Code- Annotated, as amended

4.

Section 77 •"r .16 [TI ail Jode Annotated, as amended

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
!•

Nature of , the case, '

i i i in I in,i I casu i nvn I \n tiqi an

ippea, rrom a final judgment of conviction and sentence ot a third
i?-?vc'a

felony,

- :<-

Possession

of <i Controlled

tu wit.

t h e Di s ti: :i :: I:: Cc i n: t: ::: f Da \ i s C zii i i :t t::] ; j| u tah .
Course of proceedings.

October

Substance,

I

I MM I

HI I nf ormaf i on

The state
chargi ng

of

Utah

defendant

filed on
II ef trey M

Roche IJ with II 'i Jssessxoii ol a Controlled Substance w ith Intent to
Distribute, a second degree felony; Unlawful Possession of Cocaine
*M th< ml

lav

M riiiiniii i1

»H t ixiall

I lliiiii i ill i l e q r e i ' t e l n i n y ; .mil

peed i mj

i

c J ass C misdemeanor, all alieged to have occurred on June ") , 199 1.
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in Davis County, Utah.
On February 24, 1992 defendant filed a Motion to Suppress,
together with accompanying Memorandum of Law, seeking to suppress
both baggies of cocaine seized by a state trooper.

One baggie was

seized from Defendant's person and the second baggie was taken from
his motor vehicle.
A suppression hearing was held on March 18, 1992 before
District Judge Douglas L. Cornaby.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper

David V. Maycock was called as a witness by the plaintiff, State of
Utah.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made its

findings of fact and concluded the trooper could search defendant
prior to searching his vehicle.

The trial court found it was

reasonable that all evidence could be received into evidence and
denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

Written Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law were later filed on June* 12, 1992.
On April 14, 1992 defendant petitioned the* trial court for a
review of the trial court's decision arising out of the suppression
hearing based on State v. Loveqren. 183 Utah Adv. Rep 81, (Utah
App. 1992) published April 7, 1992.

The

trial court after

reviewing Loveqren denied defendant's motion to reverse its ruling
and refused to suppress the evidence pursuant to a written ruling
filed April 15, 1992.
On April 15, 1992 Defendant Rochell entered a conditional
guilty plea to Possession of a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, a
third degree felony before District Judge Douglas L. Cornaby.
On May 12, 1992 Defendant Rochell was sentenced by District
-4-

Judge

Doug "Lao

grante«.J a 3z~a
«-• s e r v e
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.

-

to
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ordinary conditions required by the Department
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i

->r Adu 1

Frouatn. 1

judgment of the trial court was entered on June 2,

1/99 2,
Dn May 1 4, 1992 defendant fil ed a Notice of Appeal with the
Davis County Clerk's office appea 3 :1 ng to the Utah Court of Appeals

of a Controlled Substance
of

Appeal

Defendant

Contemporaneous with filing the Notice

f:i ] ed am Applicati on

for Certi f i cate of

Probable Cause and Cex til, ficate of I: >robab3 e Cause.. The Cei tificate
of Probable Cause was signed by District Judge Dougl as L. Cornaby

Defendant's appea]
On June 4j( 3 992 Defendant filed an Amended Notire of Appeal to
proper 1} per f" a ct hiu appeal J^ JludqiiienL yyj.i uiil.1.1 mi un Jum < , ! JO,!
with the Davi s County Clerk's office.
3.

Disposition at Trial Court,

On March 18, 199i!r District

3 "i idge Douglas L, Cornaby denied defendant .1 Motion to Suppress. On
April 15, 3 90! the tnaJ court denied defendant's motion to review
its pri or ruling base ill rn State v, Lovegren, IS 1 lll-.ih
(Utah App. 1992) published n 1 April
defendant entered

'

a conditional guilty
-5-

199,!,
plea

il\

mi April

lep I Ml.

10, 1992

Lo Llic cliaiye of

Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony.

On

May 12, 1992 Defendant was sentenced by District Judge Douglas L.
Cornaby. On May 14, 1992 Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal and on
June 4, 1992 filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.
4.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

On June 5, 1991 Defendant

Rochell was observed by Trooper David V. Maycock driving a Mustang
motor vehicle northbound on 1-15 near the St. Joseph's area in
North

Salt

Lake

City

(Tr. p.3).

Trooper

Maycock's

visual

observation indicated Defendant was travelling at 65 miles per hour
(Tr. p.3).

His.visual observation was confirmed by radar which he

locked in at 65 miles per hour (Tr. p.3). Defendant was traveling
10 miles per hour over the posted speed limited of 55 mph (Tr.
p.6).
The offense took place at 8:15 p.m., it was a clear day and
the sun was up (Tr. p.11).

The driver, Jeffrey W. Rochell, acted

in an appropriate manner when pulled over by Trooper Maycock (Tr.
p.12).

He did not attempt to elude, evade or otherwise flee (Tr.

p. 12).
The Defendant upon stopping exited his vehicle and walked back
toward the Trooper's vehicle (Tr. p.12).

Defendant Rochell and

Trooper Maycock met at a point between their vehicles (Tr. p.4).
The Defendant did not appear angry, argumentative, or nervous (Tr.
p.13).

Defendant upon request produced a valid driver's license

(Tr. p.13).
Trooper Maycock, standing approximately arm's length from
defendant, detected the odor of alcohol about Defendant. (Tr. p. 13,
-6-

Trooper Maycoek requested Defendant- to perform, the horizontal
gaze -v <raa^
josei veo

'*

<

.ucs

intoxicated
•* r *

: - L*
..-

-.

*

l> I I)

. .dow*;

J.

\..L<.

Trooper Maycoek

.est that Defendant was

A:- . r-s.^ul* . T'rooper Maycoek did not cite

\

--

I I'm

11 i
n

Jurmg t~.,e rield sobriet - t«--st, Trooper Mdvcock stood at least
an arm's 1 ength dista nee from. Defendant :i n order to' track the
iTio v e oiei ni I

i if

mi I"I| i

Il )ef enc'Iai mi •*" i i s y e . s

| i I' ' " i I

1 m i i i 1 iq

I lie-

e i i l i ro.

encounter with Defendant no suspacioiis or dangerous movements were
imiftdt'-! toward \\v (Observed bv Trooper Maycoek (Tr. p. 16) .
lwl*jy<: LICI- i

inn

ill

mi ill ni I i I.) 1 Illy

I.UIIM

unt. i n q

Del e n d a n l ,

mil

Trooper

i I

the field sobriety testr did not frisk Defendant Rocheli as he f e I -;
no need to do so (Tr, p. 16).
Trooper Maycoek asked Defendant to produce the registiation
for his vehicle (Tr. p. 16).
• ij'J o v *=• b o x ("T'"i" . p 1 • )

The registration was .. *ne vehicle's
Illii'pfpind.n i I:: w a ] ked fr om thei :

vehicle and reached into the glo v e box (Tr • p.l 3 ).

i 1 1 1 In i •-;

Trooper Maycoek

d :i d not search the glove box: or veh icle prior to allowing Defendant:
I in i" (".'aclh, i n t . i 1. Il lie

"flui n>> b o x ( !""i

|i

Il ) ,

Tli '• Del. eiidtin i

maile n >

gestures that he might be reaching for a weapon (Tr. p. I I, IH ) ,
Defendant produced a va] id regi stration to h i s vehicle (Tr

p. 1H)

and registration and that there were no outstanding warrants for
Defendant through his dispatcher (Tr. p. 20 , 2:11 ) .
When Defendant Rocheli opened the passenger door to obtain his
registration a blue cup containing an alcoholic beverage fell onto
-7-

the ground (Tr. p.19).

The passenger in the vehicle identified

himself as Billy G. Miller, but had no identification on him (Tr.
p.5).

While confronting the passenger, Trooper Maycock looked

inside the vehicle but did not observe any objects of concern to
him (Tr. p.19).

No second open container of alcohol was observed

by Trooper Maycock (Tr. p.20).
Trooper Maycock asked Defendant if he understood Utah's open
container

law and received

an affirmative

reply

(Tr. p.20).

Defendant was asked to return to his vehicle, and Trooper Maycock
took with him Defendant's driver's license and registration to his
patrol car (Tr. p. 20). Trooper Maycock wrote two citations, one to
Defendant for speeding 65 mph in a 55 mph zone and no seat belt and
the other citation to co-defendant Billy G. Miller for open
container (Tr. p.21, 22). During this period of time, Defendant
was detained and not free to leave (Tr. p.21).

Approximately 15

minutes had elapsed to this point in time from when Defendant was
stopped. (Tr. p.22).
After citing the Defendant and passenger, Trooper Maycock
intended to search them and the vehicle (Tr. p.23, 24).

After

completing the citations Trooper Maycock approached Defendant's
vehicle a second time (Tr. p.22).

Trooper Maycock asked them both

to step out of their vehicle and join him at the front of their
vehicle (Tr. p.22).
Neither party had done anything to indicate to Trooper Maycock
they were armed and dangerous (Tr. p.22).

Trooper Maycock had

formed the intent to search the driver's immediate area in the
-8-

vehicle for another open container (Tr. p.23). Trooper Maycock was
not searching the vehicle for weapons or drugs (Tr. p.23, 24).
At the time Trooper Maycock asked Defendant Rochell and Billy
G. Miller to join him at the front of their vehicle he had formed
the intent to search their person (Tr. p.24).

Nothing had alerted

him to the fact that either may be armed and dangerous (Tr. p.24).
Trooper Maycock asked them if they had any weapons on them.
responded they did not (Tr. p.27).

Both

Billy G. Miller voluntarily

opened his pockets and offered everything in his pockets and turned
around to show Trooper Maycock his beltline to reveal no weapons
(Tr. p.7).
Trooper Maycock directed his attention to Defendant (Tr. p.7).
He noticed a bulge in Defendant's left front pocket of his shorts,
a fairly large bulge (Tr. p.8). Trooper Maycock could not tell
what the bulge was but it appeared to be 3 1/2 inches by 1 1/2
inches to 2 inches and 1 to 1 1/2 inches thick (Tr. p. 31, 34).
Trooper Maycock could not tell what the object was only that it was
hard after tapping it with his fingers (Tr. p.32, 8 ) . Defendant
put his hand in his front left pocket and pulled out a set of keys
(Tr. p.8). Trooper Maycock observed there was still something in
Defendant's pocket and tapped it again (Tr. p.8).
asked the Defendant "What is that?" (Tr. p.32).

Trooper Maycock

Defendant reached

into his pocket a second time and pulled out some change and in the
course of doing that partially exposed a plastic baggie (Tr. p.32,
9).

Trooper Maycock asked him "What's that baggie?"

(Tr. p.9).

Defendant put his hand back into his pocket, rustled around again,
-9-

pulled his hand out of his pocket and put it behind his back (Tr.
p.9).

At that time, Officer Garrido, North Salt Lake Police,

approaching defendant from the rear, reached out and grabbed the
baggy containing a white powdery substance (Tr. p.9, 10). Officer
Garrido had radioed Trooper Maycock, while Trooper Maycock was
writing out the citations in his patrol car, to determine his
location in order to return Trooper Maycock's hcindcuffs (Tr. p.6).
Defendant Rochell was arrested by Trooper Maycock
Officer Garrido took the baggie from him

(Tr. p. 10).

after
After

mirandizing Defendant inquiry was made if there was any other dope
in the vehicle (Tr. p.10).

Trooper Maycock found a second baggie

between the cushions of the passenger seat where the riser meets
the runner (Tr. p.33).

Trooper Maycock admitted discovery of the

first baggie from Defendant led to discovery of the second baggie
in the vehicle (Tr. p. 32).
When asked why Trooper Maycock simply did not request Officer
Garrido to watch Defendant and his passenger while he searched the
vehicle Trooper Maycock responded he did not want any assisting
officer to be hurt (Tr. p.29).
Trooper Maycock also admitted he could have cited Defendant
Rochell for open container in addition to speeding and no seat belt
as Defendant allowed a passenger to have an opem container in his
vehicle (Tr. p.30).

Trooper Maycock responded that legally he

could have issued Defendant a citation for an open container but
morally he did not feel it was correct unless Defendant Rochell
actually had an open container (Tr. p.30, 31).
-10-

No

second

open

container

was

located

after

search

of

defendant's motor vehicle by Trooper Maycock and Officer Garrido
(Tr. p.25).
Trooper

Maycock

testified

his probable

cause

to

search

defendant's vehicle for a second open container was that he
detected the driver and passenger to both have an odor of alcohol
on their breath but he had only observed one open container of
alcohol in the vehicle; i.e, the blue cup that fell to the ground
(Tr. p.24, 25).
The trial court estimated approximately 15 to 25 minutes had
elapsed

from the time Defendant's vehicle was

stopped until

defendant was searched (Tr. p.46).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A peace officer may frisk a person for dangerous weapons if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger.

This is

a narrowly drawn exception to the constitutional protection that
all warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. A peace officer
may pat down an individual to neutralize the threat of harm when he
possesses specific, articulable facts that such person may be armed
and dangerous. Anything beyond such a brief intrusion to check for
weapons constitutes a de facto arrest and probable cause to search
is required.
Trooper Maycock did not initially frisk Defendant evidencing
no fear or suspicion Defendant was armed and dangerous. After the
-11-

citation was prepared, and 15 to 25 minutes had elapsed, Trooper
Maycock ordered defendant from his vehicle to search him prior to
searching his vehicle for a open container of alcohol.

Neither

Defendant nor his passenger had done anything to indicate to
Trooper Maycock they were armed or dangerous prior to his search of
Defendant (Tr. p.22).

Therefore, the frisk of Defendant Rochell

prior to searching the vehicle was not for dangerous weapons based
upon a reasonable belief or suspicion and therefore not permitted
by Terry v. Ohio or section 77-7-16 U.C.A., as amended.

Secondly,

Trooper Maycock's detention of Defendant Rochell after preparing
the traffic citations exceeded the scope of the initial traffic
stop and was not further justified by a reasonable suspicion of
serious criminal activity.

A peace officer's stop of a motor

vehicle is a seizure subject to constitutional protection.

A

traffic stop is a limited seizure and is more like an investigative
detention than a custodial arrest.

The issue of whether the

investigative detention was reasonable, as governed by Terry v.
Ohio, involves two tests:
(1)

Was Trooper Maycock's action justifi€id initially?, and

(2) Was Trooper Maycock's action reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified his initial stop?
Trooper

Maycock

properly

stopped

Defendant

Rochell

for

speeding 65 mph in a 55 mph zone. However, observation of one open
container with both occupants of the vehicle with alcohol on their
breath does not justify nor give Trooper Maycock

reasonable

articulable suspicion of serious criminal activity beyond the
-12-

initial traffic offense justifying further detention of defendant
and his later arrest.
Third, seizure of the controlled substance from Defendant's
motor vehicle was obtained by illegal exploitation and therefore
not lawfully seized. Defendant Rochell's admission and disclosure
of a second baggie of cocaine in • his vehicle was unlawfully
obtained following Trooper Maycock's illegal seizure of cocaine
from Defendant. The State of Utah must show Defendant's consent to
search his vehicle was (1) voluntary and (2) not obtained by
exploitation

of the prior

illegality.

Evidence

obtained

in

searches following police illegality must meet both tests to be
admissible. Defendant's consent to search was sufficiently tainted
from the illegal seizure of the controlled substance from his
pocket.

The consent occurred during an ongoing illegal seizure,

thus no time factor nor other intervening factors separated the
illegality from the consent.

Defendant's consent to search was

the result of the exploitation of his illegal detention and illegal
search of his person.
Finally, Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable
suspicion or probable cause to search Defendant or his motor
vehicle.

Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable

suspicion of serious criminal activity or probable cause justifying
further detention of Defendant after preparation of the citations
for speeding, no seat belt and open container.

The fact that

Defendant may have been hesitant in his responses to Trooper
Maycock's questioning when standing in front of his vehicle does
-13-

not support a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity or
probable cause. Nor does the fact that the Trooper discovered only
one open container of alcohol.

The Trooper's hunch, without more,

does not raise a reasonable articulable suspicion.

The fact that

both occupants had alcohol on their breath does not indicate there
is other alcohol in the vehicle.

Trooper Maycock could have cited

Defendant Rochell for an open container violation but chose to
search his vehicle for other evidence.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE;

THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT ROCHELL
WAS UNLAWFUL AS THERE EXISTED NO REASONABLE
BASIS TO BELIEVE DEFENDANT WAS ARMED AND
PRESENTLY DANGEROUS WHEN HE WAS FRISKED

A peace officer, pursuant to section

77-7-16, U.C.A.,

as

amended may frisk a person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably
believes he or any other person is in danger.
P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986).

State v. Roybol, 716

The Utah statute is subject to and

interpreted in light of the constitutional requirements of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

In

Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to
the requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches.
Warrantless

searches are per se unreasonable

Amendment,

subject

exceptions.

to

only

a

few

under the

specifically

Fourth

established

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed. 2d
576 (1967).
One exception to the warrant requirement permits an officer to
-14-

pat down a person for weapons when he reasonably suspects that such
person

may

be

armed

articulable facts.
standard

is

specific

and

Terry v. Ohio at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.

The

whether

and

a

dangerous

reasonably

based

upon

prudent

man

under

the

circumstances would believe that his safety or that of others was
in jeopardy. State v. Roybol, supra. A brief check for weapons is
permissible but anything beyond such a brief and narrowly defined
intrusion constitutes a de facto arrest, and probable cause is
required.

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2254

(1979).
Trooper Maycock did not initially frisk Defendant Rochell upon
confronting him

and during the time of the horizontal

nystagmus as he felt no need to do so (Tr. p. 16).

gaze

This fact

strongly suggests that once Defendant exited his vehicle and stood
within arm's length of Trooper Maycock the trooper did not suspect
he was armed and dangerous.

Prior to the actual frisk and search

of Defendant, some 15 to 25 minutes after the initial stop, neither
Defendant nor his passenger had done anything to suggest they were
armed and dangerous (Tr. p.22).

Therefore, the frisk and pat down

of Defendant Rochell prior to searching his vehicle was not for
dangerous weapons based upon a reasonable belief or suspicion
permitted by Terry v. Ohio, supra or section 77-7-16 U.C.A., as
amended.

POINT TWO:

TROOPER MAYCOCK7S DETENTION OF DEFENDANT
ROCHELL EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP
AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY A REASONABLE
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
-15-

A police officer's stop of a vehicle is a seizure subject to
fourth amendment protections.

De1aware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,

653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213,
215 (Utah App. 1991).

A traffic stop is a limited seizure and is

more like an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.
United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th Civ. 1991).

In

Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit all seizures, but only unreasonable ones.

To

determine if a seizure is reasonable two questions must be asked:
(1)

Was Trooper Maycock's action initially justified?, and (2)

Was Trooper Maycock's action reasonably relate.d in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place?
State v. Robinson. 797 P. 2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990); State v.
Parker, 189 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Utah App. 1992).
Clearly, Trooper Maycock was justified in stopping Defendant
for speeding 65 mph in a 55 mph zone (Tr. p. 3).
pretext stop (Tr. p.4 3).

It was not a

However, Trooper Maycock's conduct and

subsequent action must also be reasonably related in length and
scope to the stop of Defendant's motor vehicle for the initial
traffic violations. State v. Loveqren, 183 Utah Adv. Rep 81 (Utah
App. 1992). The Supreme Court has ruled that the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.

Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983).

Once the reasons for the initial stop of

the vehicle have been completed, the occupants must be allowed to
proceed on their way.

State v. Loveqren. supra.
-16-

Any further

temporary

detention

fulfillment

of

for

investigative

the purpose

for the

questioning

initial

after

traffic

the

stop is

justified under the fourth amendment only if the detaining police
officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity.
State v* Robinson, supra.

Whether reasonable suspicion exists

depends upon the totality of the circumstances. State v. Steward,
supra?

State v. Lovecrren, supra.

Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable suspicion
of criminal activity beyond the initial traffic offense justifying
further detention of Defendant.

Defendant gave no reason to be

searched by reason of his peaceful, cooperative attitude and
Trooper Maycock was admittedly not fearful that Defendant was armed
and dangerous (Tr. p.22).

Trooper Maycock had no reason to search

Defendant or his passenger.
Trooper Maycock did not have reasonable articulable suspicion
there would be an open container of alcohol in Defendant's vehicle.
According to Trooper Maycock it is perhaps logical and reasonable
to assume Defendant had consumed alcohol other than in his vehicle
(Tr. p.25).

Trooper Maycock had no basis to assume that there

existed an open container of alcohol within Defendant's immediate
reach when he was seated in his vehicle.

Upon actual search no

open container was discovered (Tr. p.25).

Trooper Maycock did not

observe any objects which appeared to be open containers of alcohol
when he looked inside the vehicle (Tr. p.19).

POINT THREE:

SEIZURE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FROM
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL
-17-

EXPLOITATION AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE
Defendant Rochell admitted and disclosed to Trooper Maycock
the location of a second baggie of cocaine in his vehicle following
the search and seizure of cocaine from his pocket (Tr. p.10).
Trooper Maycock admitted discovering the first baggie from the
person of Defendant led to producing the second one (Tr. p.32).
The burden of proof is upon the State of Utah to show that the
consent was voluntary and not obtained by exploitation of the prior
illegality.

State v. Arroyo, supra.

The issue is whether

Defendant's consent was sufficiently tainted by the illegal seizure
of the controlled substance from his front pocket. The factors to
be considered in an exploitation analysis are temporal proximity of
the

illegality

and the consent, the presence

circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy
misconduct.

of

intervening

of the official

Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S. Ct.

2254, 2261-2262 (1975).
The second baggie was discovered as a result of exploitation
of the illegal detention and search of Defendant's person and not
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct.

407, 417 (1963).

The State of Utah has the burden to prove the

existence of intervening factors which prove that Defendant's
consent was sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegality.
State v. Arroyo, supra.
No such intervening factors exist in this case.

Defendant's

consent was obtained during an ongoing illegal search and there is
-18-

no delay in time between the illegal search and the consent.

Nor

has the State shown any intervening circumstances separating the
illegality from the consent. Defendant's consent to search was the
result of the exploitation of his illegal detention and unlawful
search of his person.
(Utah App. 1992);

State v. Godina-Luna, 179 Utah Adv. Rep 21

State v. Harqraves, 806 P. 2d 228 (Utah App.

1991).

POINT FOUR:

TROOPER MAYCOCK DID NOT HAVE REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO
DETAIN DEFENDANT AND SEARCH DEFENDANT OR HIS
MOTOR VEHICLE

Trooper Maycock admitted he had formed the intent to search
Defendant's vehicle

for an open container and to personally frisk

Defendant and his passenger as he was approaching Defendant's
vehicle to give them their citations (Tr. p.23, 27). Therefore,
the fact that Defendant may be hesitant in responding to Trooper
Maycock's questioning and his failure to voluntarily empty his
pockets when standing in front of his vehicle did not provide
reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity nor probable
cause to search Defendant or his vehicle.

Nervous behavior when

confronted by a police officer does not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.

State v. Godina-Luna, supra.

The fact that both parties had been drinking and the Trooper
only saw one open container does not support a reasonable suspicion
of serious criminal activity justifying further detention of
defendant and search of Defendant or his vehicle. In Lovecrren, the
Court of Appeals held the fact that a car was cluttered with pop
-19-

cans, beer cans, cigarette packages and ashes does not indicate
Defendants were involved in criminal activity.

Lovegren at 83.

Trooper Maycock's "hunch" that there may be another open container
in the vehicle, without more, is not sufficient to raise a
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764.

State v.

Trooper Maycock already had lawful

authority to cite Defendant Rochelle for an open container but
chose not to do so (Tr. p. 30, 31).

There existed no reason to

search Defendant and his vehicle other than the personal desire of
Trooper Maycock.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Rochell petitions this Court to reverse the trial
court and suppress all evidence seized from Defendant's person and
his vehicle, and remand

this matter

for further

proceedings

consistent therewith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^ic?

day of August, 1992.
CAMPBELL & NEELEY

-20-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

j/V ~~~~ day of August, 1992, I

mailed four copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, Attorney for State of Utah,
Appellee, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.

10BERT L T N E S L E Y
Attorney for Defendant
Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND J U D I C I A L . D I S T R I C T
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF D A V I S , STATE OF U T A H
THE STATE OF U T A H ,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF F A C T A N D

:

CONCLUSIONS OF L A W

:

Case N o , 921700013

/

JEFFREY WARREN ROCHELL,
Defendant.

:

This matter came on for hearing on Defendant's M o t i o n to
Suppress on the 18th day of March, 1992•

Defendant w a s p r e s e n t and

represented by Robert Neeley, the State was represented b y W i l l i a m
K. M c G u i r e .

The Court, having heard evidence and considered

the

memoranda of the p a r t i e s , hereby enters its
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

Defendant was stopped for speeding 65 m i l e s p e r h o u r

in a 55 m i l e per hour zone.
2.

Officer David Maycock noticed smell of a l c o h o l

on

defendant's breath.
3.
fell

from

Upon securing the registration, an o p e n

the

passenger

side

of

the

vehicle.

The

container
officer

determined it contained alcohol.
4.

The passenger in the vehicle had also b e e n c o n s u m i n g

an alcoholic beverage.

5.

The

officer proceeded

to write

out citations;

speeding and no seat belt to defendant and open container to the
passenger. He then determined to search the vehicle for additional
open containers since both occupants had been drinking, but only
one container had been seen at that time.
6weapons.

The officer asked each occupant whether they had any

The passenger, Mr. Miller, said no, emptied his pockets

and turned around to show that he had no weapons.

The defendant

was hesitant in answering no and did not offer the contents of his
pocket.
7. The officer noticed a bulge in defendant's left front
pocket measuring 3-1/2 inches in diameter and 1 to 1-1/2 inches
deep.

The officer believed it could have been a knife or other

weapon•
8. After the officer asked what the bulge was, defendant
reached into his pocket and pulled out keys.

However, the bulge

was still present and the officer found it was still hard.

The

defendant then reached in and pulled out coins and as he did so a
portion of a plastic baggie was exposed.
9.

The officer asked what it was and the defendant said

"nothing" and pulled his hand out of the pocket and placed it
behind his back.
10.

A

second

officer, approaching

from

the rear,

observed a baggie of white powder and seized it.
11.

Following the seizure of the baggie, defendant told

the officer that another baggie was in the car and it was seized.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was a proper
traffic stop and not a pretext stop.
2.

The officer had probable cause to believe that

another alcoholic beverage was in the vehicle and therefore a
search of the vehicle for that purpose was appropriate.
3.

It was reasonable for the officer to determine if

either of the occupants were armed with weapons prior to commencing
a search of the vehicle.

Based upon what he observed, the officer

had a right to conduct a pat down of both occupants,
4.

The seizure of the plastic baggie from defendant's

hand was permissible.
5.

The seizure of the baggie from the vehicle was

pursuant to a valid arrest and appropriate impound of the vehicle.
Based

upon

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Facts

and

Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby ORDERS that defendant's motion
to suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

/qz-

day of

f.Z\.^

BY THE COURT:

, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct unexecuted
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with
postage prepaid thereon, to Robert Neeley, Attorney for Defendant
at 2495 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah
of June, 1992.

Secretary/

84401, this 3rd day

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

STATE

OF UTAH

Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL,
Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION
TO REVIEW RULING
Criminal No. 921700013

The defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, has asked for a review of
the ruling of the Court arising out of the suppression hearing.
The review is based on State v. Lovearen, 18 3 Utah Adv Rep. 81
(April 7, 1992).
The Court has reviewed that case. It finds the facts to be
distinguishable. The Highway patrolman, Trooper Haycock, asked
for the vehicle registration. Mr. Rochell opened the passenger
door of the vehicle to obtain it. A blue plastic cup containing
an alcoholic beverage fell out. It is illegal to have an open
container of an alcoholic beverage in a vehicle. This case then
became more than a routine traffic stop and the Trooper was
justified in searching the vehicle around the seats to see if
there were other alcoholic beverages. He was also justified in
searching the vehicle occupants, including the defendant, to see
that they were not carrying weapons.
The motion to review the ruling
refuses to suppress the evidence.
Dated April 14, 1992.

is

denied.

BY THE COURT:

The

Court

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to William McGuire, Davis
County Attorney's Office, Farmington, Utah 84025 and Robert L..
Neeley, 2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401 on
April /5^7 1992.

\axzLu 4^a^Hn
Clerk <]

MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-4300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL- DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Case No,. 92170 0013

vs •
JEFFREY WARREN ROCHELL,
Defendant.

Hon, Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge

The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the
12th day of May, 1992, the defendant being present in person and
represented

by his

attorney, Robert

Neeley, the

State

being

represented by Carvel R. Harward, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby,
Judge, presiding.
The defendant having been convicted upon a plea of guilty
of the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony of
the third degree, and the Court having asked if the defendant had
anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and no
sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the
Court,
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony of the
third degree, as charged and convicted.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be confiri^± and

0131043

imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of
0-5 years, and is fined $2,000 as provided by law,
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is granted a
stay of execution of the above sentence and the defendant is placed
on probation under the supervision of the Utah State Department of
Adult Probation and Parole for a period of three years under the
following conditions:
1.

Usual

and

ordinary

conditions

required

by

the

Department of Adult Probation and Parole to be set forth in an
agreement.
2.

Thirty days in the Davis County Jail with work

release.
3. All but $550 of the fine is suspended on satisfactory
completion of probation.

Fine of $550 and surcharge of $467.50 is

to be paid through the clerk of the court at a rate of $100 per
month on or before the first Tuesday of each month beginning with
July, 1992.

The defendant is to be present on any day he is not

current.
4.

No violations of law.

5.

No consumption of alcohol or alcoholic beverages.

6.

No use or possession of controlled substances.

7.

Submit to search of person, premises or vehicles and

seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request of
a probation or police officer.
8.

Submit to body fluids testing upon request.

9.

No association with known drug users.

10.

No association with co-defendants.

013104^

11.. Drug and/or alcohol evaluation and follow-up.
12.

Maintain full time employment.

13.

No living with a person of the opposite sex without

being married.
14.

Felony Drug Supervision Program.

IT IS ORDERED that the Davis County Sheriff take the said
defendant into his custody and confine and imprison said defendant
in the Davis County Jail for the period of 30 days.
DATED this

/

^ 7>/^«,

day of

, 1992.

E

f

BY T7HE COURT:

\ .s~\,.sL

/-

//

y—&<=^s^

JUDGTE--^

Mailed an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment this
&Ky^* day of May, 1992 to Robert Neeley, Attorney for Defendant, at
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200/ Ogden, Utah

84401.

fy-tf/jftChAj'A

